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Real Business Cycles: A Legacy of
Countercyclical Policies?
Satyajit Chatterjee*
Business cycles have troubled market-ori-
ented economies since the dawn of the indus-
trial age. The upward march of living standards
in capitalistic countries has been repeatedly
punctuated by periods of markedly high unem-
ployment rates and slow growth or an outright
decline in the living standard of the average per-
son. This alternating pattern of boom and bust
is what the term business cycle means.
In an article published in 1986, Edward
Prescott forcefully argued that during the post-
World-War II period, business cycles in the
United States mostly resulted from random
changes in the growth rate of business-sector
productivity.1 He showed that upswings in eco-
nomic activity occurred when productivity grew
at an above-average rate and downswings oc-
*Satyajit Chatterjee is a senior economist and research
advisor in the Research Department of the Philadelphia
Fed.
1Edward Prescott is a professor of Economics at the
University of Chicago and a long-time research consult-
ant to the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. The an-
tecedents of his views appear in an article he wrote with
Finn Kydland in 1982 and in a 1983 article by John Long
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curred when productivity grew at a below-aver-
age rate.
Prescott challenged the dominant view that
business cycles are caused by monetary and fi-
nancial disturbances. According to that view,
upswings in economic activity result from un-
expectedly rapid increases in the supply of
money, while downswings result from slow
growth or a fall in the money supply. In contrast,
Prescott and his collaborators presented evi-
dence that business cycles of the sort seen dur-
ing the postwar era would occur even if there
were no monetary or financial disturbances.
John Long and Charles Plosser coined the
term real business cycles to describe business
cycles whose proximate causes are random
changes in productivity.2 Without a doubt, the
most controversial aspect of real-business-cycle
theory is its implications for countercyclical
monetary and fiscal policies. Real-business-cycle
theory appears to ascribe no importance to ex-
isting countercyclical policies. Moreover, it im-
plies that some policies aimed at reducing the
severity of business cycles are likely to entail
more costs than benefits.
Both implications contradict long-held views.
Indeed, these policy implications strike many
economists as so outrageous that they simply
dismiss real-business-cycle theory as false. Yet,
the theory has successfully countered the many
objections leveled against it.3  As a result,
macroeconomists are beginning to take it more
seriously.
Of course, countercyclical policies are of para-
mount importance to the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem.  As real-business-cycle theory gains increas-
ing acceptance among economists, an under-
standing of its policy implications becomes cru-
cial. Consequently, this article briefly describes
real-business-cycle theory, then turns to a dis-
cussion of its implications for countercyclical
policies.
The policy lessons of real-business-cycle
theory are more subtle than they appear at first
blush.  Although the theory ascribes no osten-
sible role to postwar countercyclical policies, its
success in accounting for U.S. business cycles
may be the clearest indication yet of the effec-
tiveness of these policies.  At the same time,
though, the doubts raised by the theory about
the wisdom of some policy initiatives to control
business cycles may be well founded.
A PRIMER ON REAL-BUSINESS-CYCLE
THEORY
Real-business-cycle theory uses changes in
productivity to explain the cyclical ups and
downs in economic activity. To understand the
theory, we need to know what productivity
means and how changes in it can cause booms
and recessions.
The total output of an economy can be mea-
sured by the sum of value-added in all firms. The
value-added in a firm during a quarter is the
value of goods and services produced by the firm
in that quarter less the value of goods and ser-
vices purchased from other firms and used up
in production in that quarter.4 Clearly, total out-
put is related to the total time people spend work-
ing in these firms and the quantity of producers’
2In this context, the term real means that the business
cycle is caused by factors not related to changes in the
money supply.
3See my 1995 Business Review article for a more de-
tailed discussion of real-business-cycle theory and an
account of how well the theory has rebutted the criti-
cisms brought against it.
4Goods and services purchased from firms and used
up in production in the same quarter are called interme-
diate inputs. When value-added is summed over all
firms, purchases of intermediate inputs cancel out, and
all that remains are goods and services sold to consum-
ers and governments plus goods and services sold to
firms but not used up in production during that quarter.
Hence, total output could also be calculated as the value
of final goods and services (i.e., goods and services that
are not intermediate inputs) sold by firms during a quar-
ter plus additions to inventory.Banking Industry Consolidation: What's a Small Business to Do? Loretta J. Mester
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goods (such as machinery or buildings) that as-
sist in production.
However, total output could also change if
the effectiveness of the workers and equipment
used in production changes. For instance, sup-
pose a manufacturer of plastic products figures
out some mechanical modification that reduces
wastage of plastic, i.e., the modification allows
the same quantity of products to be manufac-
tured using less plastic. In that case, value-added
at any given level of hours worked and equip-
ment used will be higher.  Economists refer to
this change in the effectiveness with which work-
ers and machinery generate value-added as a
change in total factor productivity (TFP).
  The most important reasons TFP changes
over time are improvements in the technology
for producing goods and services  (as in the ex-
ample above) and improvements in workers’
skills. However, TFP could also change for other
reasons. For example, TFP rises when new prod-
ucts are invented and sold by firms or when the
price of an imported input (such as oil) falls.
TFP may fall when the government imposes
stiffer environmental protection laws or when a
drought reduces crop yields.5
According to real-business-cycle theory, an
above-average rate of growth of TFP means that
more than the usual opportunities exist for the
gainful employment of labor and machinery. To
exploit this bonanza, firms invest more than
usual in buildings and equipment and hire more
than the usual number of workers. The addi-
tional income generated by above-average TFP
growth and by the increased production of build-
ings and equipment leads to an increase in con-
sumption. Thus, macroeconomic variables such
as total output, consumption, investment, and
hours worked simultaneously rise above their
respective long-term trends. Furthermore, a quar-
ter of above-average TFP growth tends to be fol-
lowed by more quarters of above-average TFP
growth, so that the increase in macroeconomic
variables tends to persist for some time.  That is
how real-business-cycle theory explains a boom.
In an analogous fashion, real-business-cycle
theory explains recessions as the result of sev-
eral quarters of below-average TFP growth.
How well does this theory work? Charles
Plosser calculated the values of several key mac-
roeconomic variables predicted by the theory for
the years 1954 through 1985 (Figures 1 and 2).6
As is evident, the match between theory and facts
is not perfect, but it is remarkably close.  In a
1991 article, Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott
calculated that real-business-cycle theory can
account for about 70 percent of postwar busi-
ness-cycle fluctuations in U.S. output.
To summarize, real-business-cycle theory uses
fluctuations in the growth rate of TFP to explain
business cycles. The theory gives a good account
of the cyclical behavior of major U.S. macroeco-
nomic variables during the postwar period. Still,
since the theory leaves about 30 percent of the
cyclical fluctuations in U.S. output unexplained,




What lessons concerning countercyclical
macroeconomic policies can be drawn from real-
business-cycle theory? Many economists think
that real-business-cycle theory implies that ex-
isting countercyclical policies aren’t necessary.
But is that really true?
Real-business-cycle theory simply calculates
the optimal response to random variations in
TFP growth for an economic model that resembles
5For a fuller discussion of factors affecting TFP, see
my 1995 Business Review article.
6These plots were taken from Charles Plosser’s 1989
article, Figure 2 (p. 64) and Figure 4 (p. 65). To conserve
space, the figures for consumption and hours worked
were omitted. The reader may consult Plosser’s 1989
article for the omitted figures and more detail about
real-business-cycle theory.
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the U.S. economy in impor-
tant respects.  Prescott pre-
sented these calculations as
a prediction of how the U.S.
economy would actually be-
have when faced with erratic
TFP growth. He made this
connection by invoking a gen-
eral principle of economics,
namely, that competition
tends to produce economi-
cally optimal outcomes.7
In other words, Prescott
proceeded on the assump-
tion that for the purposes of
business-cycle analysis, the
actual workings of the U.S.
economy are well approxi-
mated by a model economy
with perfect markets, that is, a
model economy in which all
markets are highly competi-
tive and all markets function
smoothly without any need
for government regulation.
Since, according to economic
theory, a perfect-markets
economy will generate opti-
mal economic outcomes,
Prescott simply calculated
the optimal response of his
model economy to fluctua-







7The principle dates back, in the
guise of Adam Smith’s famous
“invisible hand,” to the origin of
modern economics. Smith was one
of the first social philosophers to
argue that intrusive regulation of
commerce and industry is eco-
nomically harmful. He argued that
the freedom to form mutually ad-
vantageous contracts (unregulated
markets) is the best guarantor of
efficient economic outcomes.
Reprinted, with permission, from Plosser, Charles I., "Understanding
Real Business Cycles," Journal of Economic Perspectives 3, 1989, p. 64.
Reprinted, with permission, from Plosser, Charles I., "Understanding
Real Business Cycles," Journal of Economic Perspectives 3, 1989, p. 65.Banking Industry Consolidation: What's a Small Business to Do? Loretta J. Mester
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these responses to be a prediction of how the
actual U.S. economy would behave with respect
to those same fluctuations. The close match be-
tween predictions and fact means that his as-
sumption was not far off the mark; somehow,
the U.S. economy manages to mimic a perfect-
markets economy.
Real-business-cycle theorists’ oft-repeated
claim that the U.S. economy behaves like a per-
fect-markets economy has fostered the impres-
sion that the theory means the economy doesn’t
need countercyclical policies. However, the per-
fect markets of economic theory do not exist in
the real world. The economic outcomes against
which the predictions of real-business-cycle
theory are compared have resulted from an in-
terplay of  imperfect markets and a vast array of
laws, regulations, policies, and customs that help
or hinder the workings of these markets. Thus,
the important policy question raised by real-
business-cycle theory is: Did postwar
countercyclical policies help the U.S. economy
attain its near-optimal business-cycle behavior
or did they hinder it?
A question like this cannot lie too long with-
out eliciting some response.  And one came in a
30th anniversary review of Milton Friedman and
Anna Schwartz’s A Monetary History of the United
States, 1867-1960.8 The reviewer was Robert E.
Lucas, Jr., a leading proponent of the monetary
view of business cycles and a recent recipient of
the Nobel Prize in Economics. Lucas used the
review as an opportunity to trace the book’s sig-
nificance for subsequent developments in mac-
roeconomics. Toward the end of his review, he
appraised real-business-cycle theory in the light
of A Monetary History.
Unlike other critics of real-business-cycle
theory, Lucas accepts the theory’s central find-
ing, namely, that TFP shocks can lead to “output
variability of about the same magnitude as ob-
served in the U.S. in the postwar period” and
can realistically explain the behavior of other
variables. Most important, he reconciles this find-
ing with the lessons of A Monetary History by
noting that one may think of real-business-cycle
theory as “providing a good approximation to
events when monetary policy is conducted well
and a bad approximation when it is not.” He
then goes on to say, “Viewed in this way, the
theory’s relative success in accounting for post-
war experience can be interpreted simply as evi-
dence that postwar monetary policy has resulted
in near-efficient behavior, not as evidence that
money doesn’t matter.” Simply put, Lucas’s
point is that since real-business-cycle theory
shows it’s not necessary to invoke monetary and
financial disturbances to explain postwar busi-
ness cycles, monetary policy during the post-
war period must have been better than in the
prewar period studied by Friedman and
Schwartz.
Lucas’s reconciliation of real-business-cycle
theory with U.S. monetary history suggests an
answer to the question posed earlier about
whether postwar countercyclical policies helped
or hindered the U.S. economy: The postwar U.S.
economy may mimic a perfect-markets economy
in part because postwar monetary policy and other
countercyclical policies have prevented mon-
etary and financial instabilities from dominat-
ing business fluctuations.  Still, it is possible that
instead of guiding the U.S. economy toward op-
timal behavior, these policies may have caused
the discrepancy between actual and optimal be-
havior (Figures 1 and 2). Thus, to argue convinc-
ingly that postwar countercyclical policies were
beneficial, we should also explain how these
policies improved the economy’s cyclical per-
8For those not in the know, A Monetary History, pub-
lished in 1963, is the definitive statement of the view that
monetary instability is a major factor in business cycles.
In the words of the authors, the objective of the book is to
give an account of “the stock of money in the United
States” and of the “reflex influence that the stock of
money exerted on the course of events.” It is still the
book to read for obtaining the factual basis of the view
that business cycles result from monetary and financial
disturbances.
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formance and provide some evidence that they,
in fact, did so.
FINANCIAL MARKETS AND
THE  BENEFITS OF
COUNTERCYCLICAL POLICIES
The legal and regulatory framework that
shaped U.S. countercyclical policies in the post-
war era was established in the years following
the Great Depression, the disaster that spurred
the adoption of policies to regulate many sectors
of the U.S. economy. The policies most relevant
for counteracting business cycles are those aimed
at banks and financial markets.
Historically, financial markets have dis-
played a tendency to overreact to a deterioration
in business conditions. During a downturn, it’s
normal practice for financial intermediaries to
raise their credit standards and for risk-averse
investors to shift out of stocks and bonds into
cash and government securities. These actions
reduce the amount of credit extended to the pri-
vate nonfinancial sector and raise interest rates
charged on loans. Usually, the cutback in credit
does not lead to widespread financial distress,
although some firms (and households) go bank-
rupt. But if the cutback is severe, many firms may
fail. Widespread business failures, in turn, may
cause the failure of financial intermediaries and
lead to further cutbacks in credit and more bank-
ruptcies. This self-propelled cycle of credit cut-
backs and bankruptcies leads to a financial crisis
that results in low output, high unemployment,
and very low investment.
Why a business downturn becomes a full-
blown financial crisis is not fully understood,
but investor pessimism plays an important role.
If enough people think that a business contrac-
tion is about to degenerate into a financial crisis
and act accordingly, the crisis will, in fact, mate-
rialize: investors, fearing a financial crisis, may
withdraw so much cash from banks and other
depository institutions that they may force even
sound financial institutions to run out of cash
and fail.  Furthermore, an economy that suffers
one financial crisis becomes prone to suffering
more crises because investors begin to view ev-
ery downturn with alarm, and their pessimism
and fear cause downturns to degenerate into cri-
ses more often. In such a situation, counter-
cyclical policies can restore investor confidence
in the ability of financial markets to weather
downturns.
In the United States, three financial-market
countercyclical policies serve this purpose. The
first is the federal insurance through which each
account at a bank or other depository financial
institution is insured up to $100,000.9  This in-
surance protects small depositors from bank fail-
ures and removes their incentive to withdraw
deposits during downturns or at any other time,
thus blocking one channel through which large-
scale cutbacks in credit occur.
The second policy is a commitment by the
Federal Reserve to act as  “lender of last resort”
when some event threatens to precipitate a cri-
sis. Generally, these are events that have the po-
tential to inflict serious losses on loans made by
the banking system. In such a situation, the Fed
acts as  “lender of last resort” by arranging loans
that permit illiquid but solvent financial institu-
tions to honor their obligations.  For instance,
during the 1987 stock-market crash, the Fed
made more credit available to the banking sys-
tem until the crisis had passed. The policy pre-
vents a “run” on uninsured deposits in banks
and thus blocks a second channel through which
large-scale cutbacks in credit occur.
Finally, the Fed’s countercyclical interest rate
policy also helps keep financial crises at bay. By
raising interest rates and slowing down the
growth of debt in booms, the policy makes it less
necessary for banks and investors to cut back
drastically on credit during the next
contractionary phase.  And by reducing interest
9Although the FDIC insures each account, there are
restrictions on the amount of insurance a single indi-
vidual with multiple accounts at the same institution
can get.Banking Industry Consolidation: What's a Small Business to Do? Loretta J. Mester
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rates during contractions, the Fed makes it easier
for businesses and households to service their
debts, reducing the number of bankruptcies.
In summary, post-WWII  monetary and bank-
ing policies were aimed at preventing financial
markets from amplifying the effects of both busi-
ness downturns and the financial disturbances
(such as a stock-market crash) that often pre-
cede business downturns. But how well did these
policies do? Real-business-cycle theory suggests
they did well because the theory holds that it’s
not necessary to invoke monetary and financial
disturbances in order to explain postwar busi-
ness cycles. However, we also have more direct
evidence of their benefits: business cycles from
the prewar era exhibit greater financial instabil-
ity and sharper fluctuations in output than those
from the postwar era.
A COMPARISON OF PRE- AND
POST-WORLD-WAR-II BUSINESS CYCLES
Scholars who have examined the evolution
of U.S. business cycles document important dif-
ferences between post-WWII cycles and those
from the prewar era. First, financial crises were
more common during business downturns in
the pre-WWII era. In his 1992 book on business
cycles, Victor Zarnowitz records that a financial
crisis occurred during the contractionary phase
of four out of the 15 business cycles between 1870
and 1927, and two financial crises occurred dur-
ing the contractionary phase of the business cycle
that began in November 1927 and ended in
March 1933. Generally speaking, the prewar
downturns in which financial crises occurred
were more severe than those in which no crisis
occurred. In contrast, in the 66 years since 1933,
the United States has not suffered a single pre-
war-style financial crisis.10
Second, during downturns, depositors tend
to increase their holdings of cash and banks tend
to increase their cash reserves while making fewer
loans. This shift toward greater liquidity on the
part of depositors and banks is reflected in the
fall in the ratio of bank loans to the monetary
base (the sum of currency held by the public and
bank reserves) during downturns. Clearly, this
ratio should be much more volatile when the
financial system is prone to crises than when it
is not: the fear of a crisis and the passing of such
fear should cause the ratio to plunge and soar
over time. Indeed, it appears that the cyclical
volatility in the ratio of bank credit to the mon-
etary base was much more marked in the pre-
WWII era  (Figure 3).11 The same is true for the
U.S. money supply, of which the ratio of bank
loans to the monetary base is an important de-
terminant (Figure 4).12  Overall, cyclical monetary
control has been far better in the postwar period
compared with the prewar era.13
Did a fall in the volatility of economic activity
accompany the fall in the volatility of the U.S.
money supply? Apparently it did. Business-cycle
fluctuations in the gross national product (GNP)
of the United States also show a dramatic reduc-
tion of volatility in the postwar period (Figure
5).14 Furthermore, there is a strong association
between up-and-down movements in the money
10This is not to say that there were no financial disor-
ders in the postwar period. For instance, the S&L indus-
try faced a serious crisis in the 1980s. However, there
were no major runs on banks associated with this crisis.
11The proxy measure of bank credit used in Figure 3
is the difference between the M2 measure of money sup-
ply and the monetary base.
12The volatility of the ratio of  bank loans to the mon-
etary base, as measured by the standard deviation, fell
from 5.4 percent in the prewar period (1875-1941) to 2.1
percent in the postwar period (1946-1997). The stan-
dard deviation of the money supply fell from 4.7 percent
in the prewar period to 1.7 percent in the postwar period.
13Of course, in another important sense, it has not
been.  As is well known, the postwar era has witnessed
the worst inflation in U.S. history. The rapid increase in
the money supply that fed the inflation of the 1960s and
the 1970s caused the trend path of the money supply to
shoot up. Nevertheless, fluctuations around this rapidly
rising trend line were small compared with similar fluc-
tuations in the prewar era.
Real Business Cycles: A Legacy of Countercyclical Policies?                                                                        Satyajit Chatterjee24 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA
BUSINESS REVIEW JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1999
supply during the prewar
period and the up-and-
down movements in prewar
GNP.15 This lends credence
to the view that better mon-
etary control was a key fac-
tor in the decline in volatil-
ity of postwar GNP in the
United States.
Although Lucas and
others are right to stress the
importance of better mon-
etary policies, we should
not think that the entire
drop in the GNP’s volatil-
ity is a result of better mon-
etary control. Other ele-




Cyclical Changes in the Ratio
Of Bank Loans to Monetary Base
1875-1997
FIGURE 4
Cyclical Changes in the Money Supply
1875-1997
14The standard deviation
of fluctuations around trend in
prewar GNP is 4.8 percent, as
compared to 2.3 percent in the
postwar period. However, be-
cause of the fragmentary na-
ture of information on prewar
GNP, there is controversy about
how volatile prewar GNP re-
ally was. Some scholars have
suggested that for the period
preceding the Great Depres-
sion, U.S. GNP was only
slightly more volatile than in
the postwar period. For details,
consult the 1989 articles by
Christina Romer and by
Nathan Balke and Robert Gor-
don.
15The correlation coeffi-
cient between the fluctuations
around trend in money supply
and real GNP, a measure of
how closely two data series
move together, is +0.56 in the
prewar period, but -0.02 in the
postwar period.
Figure shows percentage deviations from trend. In this figure, as in the
following ones, the trend is calculated using a procedure described by
Robert Hodrick and Edward Prescott.  The percentage deviation from
trend is simply 100 times the ratio of the difference between the actual
and trend value of a variable to its trend.  The historical data on which
this figure and the following ones are based are taken from Appendix B of
the The American Business Cycle, Robert J. Gordon, ed., Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1986.
Figure shows percentage deviations from trend of the M2 measure of the
money supply.Banking Industry Consolidation: What's a Small Business to Do? Loretta J. Mester
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maintenance” programs, probably contributed
to the decline as well. For instance, unemploy-
ment insurance (which didn’t exist in most states
before 1930, but covered more than half the civil-
ian workforce by the late 1940s) and progressive
taxation (which reduces the income-tax rate for
households that experience a decline in income)
probably helped  reduce output volatility by shor-




Because fluctuations in the growth rate of TFP
are a major source of business cycles, the most
effective countercyclical
policy is one that elimi-
nates—or at least re-
duces—the random move-
ments in TFP growth. Be-
cause people generally like
stable economic environ-
ments, such a policy would
make them better off.
Unfortunately, econo-
mists and policymakers do
not know a sure-fire way
to eliminate random fluc-
tuations in TFP growth.
However, what policy-
makers can do is adopt
policies to buffer people
against the consequences
of fluctuations in TFP
growth.  But a surprising
implication of real-business-cycle theory is that
such buffering may make people worse off.
To see why, suppose that policymakers enact
a plan that dissuades businesses from increas-
ing the rate of investment during periods of
above-average TFP growth and encourages them
to keep up their rate of investment during peri-
ods of below-average TFP growth. By forcing
businesses to invest at a steadier rate, the policy
will reduce random fluctuations in consump-
tion, hours worked, and output. However, by dis-
couraging investments when the growth rate of
TFP is above average and encouraging invest-
ments when it’s below average, the policy also
entails a loss in output.17 Thus, the policy would
make people better off only if the benefits of
FIGURE 5
Cyclical Changes in Real GNP
1875-1997
16Another factor to keep in mind is that the structure
of the U.S. economy has changed over time and some of
these changes may have reduced business-cycle volatil-
ity. For instance, the rising share of service-sector income
and employment, a sector that’s not very cyclical, must
have reduced the cyclical volatility of postwar GNP.
Thus, economists must assess the contribution of these
types of structural changes to gain a keener appreciation
of the beneficial role of postwar countercyclical policies.
17The expected return on new investment is above
average when the growth rate of TFP is above average
and it is below average when the growth rate of TFP is
below average. Therefore, the loss in future output from
curtailing new investments during periods of above-av-
erage TFP growth will exceed the gain in future output
from expanding new investments during periods of be-
low-average TFP growth.
Figure shows percentage deviations from trend of real GNP measured in
1972 prices.
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greater stability outweighed the value of lost
output.
However, recall that according to real-busi-
ness-cycle theory, people and firms adjust in-
vestment spending and hours worked so that
the value of output foregone by not responding
more aggressively to fluctuations in TFP is bal-
anced by the benefits of the resulting stability in
the levels of income, consumption, and hours
worked. In other words, according to the theory,
the “predicted” paths for output and investment
shown in Figures 1 and 2 are the U.S. economy’s
optimal responses to TFP shocks. Because the
optimal response calls for large fluctuations in
real investment, a policy that attempts to smooth
away these fluctuations will make people worse
off: the value of lost output will outweigh the
benefits of greater stability.
More generally, the resemblance between ac-
tual and optimal business cycles implies that
further progress in reducing the ill effects of busi-
ness cycles can come only from reducing ran-
dom fluctuations in the rate of TFP growth.
Merely buffering the economy against these ran-
dom changes is unlikely to make people better
off because people and businesses seem to be
responding to these random changes in an al-
most optimal way.
However, it’s possible that other counter-
cyclical policies could reduce fluctuations in TFP
growth. For instance, some researchers have ar-
gued that the bank failures during the Great
Depression may have caused TFP to fall by mak-
ing it more difficult for businesses to carry out
production. Thus, the conduct of monetary
policy could have direct effects on fluctuations
in TFP. However, no one has yet created an eco-
nomic model that convincingly demonstrates
this possibility. Until we have such a model,
Prescott’s questioning of the need for additional
countercyclical policies deserves to be heeded.
SUMMARY
Real-business-cycle theory cites changes in
business-sector productivity as a proximate
cause of booms and recessions. The theory suc-
ceeds in accounting for a large fraction of the
cyclical fluctuations in postwar U.S. output and
gives a good account of the cyclical behavior of
key macroeconomic variables.
This article has discussed the theory’s impli-
cations for existing and prospective
countercyclical policies. The theory suggests that
policy initiatives to buffer the effects of business
cycles may not be necessary; postwar business
cycles are close to what we would ideally expect
as a result of random fluctuations in the growth
rate of business-sector productivity.  Unless we
can devise policies that reduce the fluctuations
in business-sector productivity itself,  there may
be little to be gained by shaping the U.S.
economy’s response to these fluctuations.
However, the theory’s implications for exist-
ing countercyclical policies remains a matter of
debate. One possibility is that the success of real-
business-cycle theory reflects better post-WWII
countercyclical policies. In particular, federal
deposit insurance and lender-of-last-resort fa-
cilities, along with superior cyclical control of
the money supply and income-maintenance
programs such as unemployment insurance and
progressive taxation, reduced some of the insta-
bilities that characterized pre-WWII business
cycles. As a result, the volatility of output over
the course of business cycles fell after World War
II, and fluctuations in the growth rate of busi-
ness-sector productivity (rather than monetary
and financial disturbances) surfaced as the
dominant source of business cycles. In this sense,
real business cycles may be the legacy of
countercyclical policies.Banking Industry Consolidation: What's a Small Business to Do? Loretta J. Mester
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